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INTRODUCTION

Tphe close corporation' operates in a continual atmosphere of conflict
and self-dealing. Typical close corporation transactions between
directors and the corporation, such as the purchase and sale of assets
between the corporation and the director-shareholders, the compensation
of director-shareholders, or loans from the corporation to the directorshareholders produce conflicts which, more often than not, evolve from
frustration to friction, from friction to disaffection and, ultimately, from
disaffection to litigation. Problems caused by transactions between a
corporation and one or more of its directors have 2constituted a pervasive
theme of corporate law for the last half century.
Statutory solutions for such problems were first attempted in the

1930's. 3 Projects of the American Bar Association 4 and the American

* Lizabeth A. Moody, Interim Dean, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University; A.B., Columbia University; LL.B., Yale University. Lynn Howell provided valuable research assistance in connection with this Article.
1 There are many definitions of the term "close corporation." See 1 F. ONEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1971). For the purposes of this article, the close corporation will
be defined as a corporation which has few shareholders all of whom are active in the
management and conduct of the business.
2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31 (3d ed. 1985).
3 Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Reponses to Interested Directors,Transactions:A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?,53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 201, 204 (1977).
4 The project began in 1980 and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act was
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Law Institute 5 have again focused attention on statutory provisions
relating to conflicts of interests. In recent years the central piece for
discussion of statutory approaches to dealings between a corporation and
its directors has concerned the public corporation, particulary defensive
measures in connection with tender offers and the dismissal of the
6
derivative action.
The revisers have paid little attention to the application of such
provisions to close corporations. 7 The focus for close corporations, instead,
has been on careful planning by the shareholders permitted by the
statutory provisions relating to close corporations." These provisions
provide sufficient flexibility to make it posssible to reduce the business
bargain to writing at the outset of the venture by anticipating that
conflicts will arise and structuring the corporation's governance in such
a way as to avoid many of the outcomes which frequently erupt into bad
feelings and law suits.9

published in final form in 1984. The MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. (3d ed. 1985) was also
developed as a result of the project. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter,63 TEX. L. REV. 1455,
1455 n. 1 (1985).
A.L.I., 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1985). A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
(Tent. Draft No. 1 1985); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, (Tent. Draft No. 2
1984); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, (Tent. Draft No. 3 1984); A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, (Tent. Draft No. 4 1985); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986).
6 See Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project,35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 939-46 (1983). See also Brudney, The Independent Director Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 628-29 (1982).
' See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 1466. Professor Hamilton, who served as the reporter
for the Revised Model Business Corporate Act Project states, with respect to the Revised
Act:
My most serious criticism of the Committee consensus is that, even though the
Act will be applicable primarily to corporations not registered under the federal
securities acts, the Committee tended to overemphasize the potential effects of
Model Act provisions on publicly held corporations. Most Model Act states, of
course, have both publicly held and closely held corporations; consequently, it is
important that provisions be workable for publicly held corporations as well as
equitable in the closely held corporation. In a number of instances, however,
Committee members seemed to draw illustrations exclusively from publicly held
corporations even when the issues under discussion, such as conflict-of-interest
transactions between a director and the corporation, were more likely to arise, or
to pose more serious problems, in closely held corporations.
Id. at 1465-66. See also Folk, Conflicts of Interest Under State Law, 3 INST. ON SEC. REG. 179
(1972) (application of statutes to the close corporation is not discussed).
' See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at §§ 3.01- 3.39.
9 In order to attempt to overcome the presumption of invalidity or to introduce
certainty of result into self-dealing transactions, corporate counsel at an early time began
to insert provisions into the charter and/or bylaws of corporations which purported to permit
interested directors to contract with the corporation. The effect of such clauses remain
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Advanced planning is not always possible. The problem which arises
may never have been anticipated. It is very likely that the participants in

uncertain. Interpreting these clauses, courts have held that they permit the directors to be
part of the quorum and reverse the rule of voidability or negate the rule which requires the
interested director to carry the burden of proving fairness, placing the burden of proving
unfairness on the persons attacking the transaction. Some courts have afforded them no
efficacy whatsoever.
O'Neal gives examples of two such charter clauses:
Transactionsin Which Directorsare Interested
A director of this Corporation shall not be disqualified by his office from dealing
or contracting with this Corporation either as a vendor, purchaser or otherwise,
nor shall any transaction or contract of this Corporation be void or voidable by
reason of the fact that any director or any firm of which any director is a member
or any corporation of which any director is a shareholder, office or director, is in
any way interested in such transaction or contract, provided that, after such
interest shall have been disclosed, such transaction or contract is or shall be
authorized, ratified or approved either (1) by a vote of a majority of a quorum of
the Board of Directors or of the Executive Committee, without counting in such
majority or quorum any director so interested or any director who is a member of
a firm so interested, or a shareholder, officer or director of a corporation so
interested, or
(2) by the written consent, or by a vote at a stockholders' meeting, of the holders
of record of a majority of all the outstanding shares of stock of this Corporation
entitled to vote; nor shall any director be liable to account to this Corporation for
any profits realized by or from or through any such transaction or contract of this
Corporation authorized, ratified or approved as aforesaid by reason of the fact that
he, or any firm of which he is a member or any corporation of which he is a
shareholder, officer or director was interested in such transaction or contract.
Nothing herein contained shall create liability in the events above described or
prevent the authorization, ratification or approval of such contracts in any other
manner provided by law.
InterestedDirectors
(a) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
directors, or between a corporation and any other corporation, firm, association or
other entity in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers, or are
financially interested, shall be either void or voidable for this reason alone or by
reason alone that such director or directors are present at the meeting of the
board, as of a committee thereof, which approves such contract or transaction, or
that his or their votes are counted for such purpose;
(1) If the facts of such common directorship, officership or financial interest is
disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the board or committee
approves such contract or transaction by a vote sufficient for such purpose without
counting the vote or votes of such interested director or directors;
(2) If such common directorship, officership or financial interest is disclosed or
known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and such contract or
transaction is approved by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) If the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable as to the corporation at
the time it is approved by the board, a committee or the shareholders.
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence
of a quorum at a meeting of the board or of a committee which approves such
contract or transaction.
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the enterprise will not concentrate on eventualities which they feel will
never come to fruition. In the sachaarin environment which surrounds
the birth of most close corporations, even the most expert lawyer finds it
difficult to focus the clients' attention on original sin. Less experienced
counsel never bother. Too many close corporations are formed using self
help and, even when assisted by a lawyer mid-wife, trace their beginnings to the stationery store rather than to informed planning.
A major function of general corporation statutes, in addition to enabling the formation of entities with limited liabilty, is to supply
gap-filling standard form provisions which make rules for a given
contingency where the participants have failed to do so. ' 0 Many corporation laws, for example, supply a fairly complete set of bylaws for a
corporation when the corporation's shareholders either do not adopt
bylaws or fail to cover a certain matter in the bylaws adopted.'1
It is the purpose of this article to consider state statutory provisions
governing conflicts of interest and their application to close corporations
to determine whether or not such provisons provide useful rules for the
unanticipated conflict which arises during corporate operations.

(c) The board shall have authority to fix the compensation of directors for
services in any capacity.
Id. at § 10.20.
1o Laws relating to intestacy are perhaps the best example of such provisions where in

effect the statute supplies a will for those who fail to write their own. See UNiFoRM
CODE §§

PRoATE

2-101 to 2-114, 2-301, 2-302 (6th ed. 1983). In the Comment to 2-101 it is

stated:
The Code attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner of wealth as to
disposition of his property at death and for this purpose the prevailing patterns in
wills are useful in determining what the owner who fails to execute a will would
probably want.
A principle purpose of this Article and Article III of the Code is to provide

suitable rules and provisions for persons of modest means who rely on the estate
plan provided by law.
While the prescribed patterns may serve the same as rules of law which may in
some cases defeat the interest of a decedent, this is true of any statute of this type.
In assessing the changes it must therefore by borne in mind that the decedent may

always choose a difficult rule by executing a will.
Id. at 24-25. See also Ribsteen, An Analysis of Georgia'sNew PartnershipLaws, 36 MERCER

L. REV. 443, 445 (1985). The author there, in discussing the Uniform Partnership Act, points
out that statutes which function to provide parties to business associations a standard form
agreement governing their relationship are economically efficient in that the parties (1)

save the costs of a "custom-made agreement;" (2) are informed of their rights reducing the
need for litigation; and (3) usually obtain what they would have arrived at through
negotiation although they initially failed to think through the legal consequence of their
dealings.
"

E.g., MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 7.01-7.28 (3d ed. 1985).
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II.

THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINES

The common law doctrine governing transactions between a director
and the corporation evolved from a rule of absolute voidability to a rule
of fairness. 12 Early cases held that any contract between a director and
the corporation was voidable at the instance of the corporation, without
regard to any other factor such as fairness or unfairness.' 3 The rationale
for the rule was that the director's duty of loyalty was inevitably
compromised by a transaction in which the director stood on both sides.
The early cases not only assumed that the director would act in his own
interest vis-a-vis the corporation but also assumed that co-directors would
be sufficiently influenced by their colleague so as to become interested as
well.14
Cases applying the rule of voidability gradually gave way to a rule
based on the trust principle that a trustee can deal with the trust if there
is full disclosure and the beneficiary of the trust consents to the
transaction; thus the rule developed that a contract between a director
and the corporation is valid if it is approved by a disinterested majority
of the directors and a court finds that it is neither unfair nor fraudulent.'s

12 See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22

Bus. LAW. 35 (1966). This work is a classic analysis of the development of common law
doctrines concerning director conflicts of interest. See also A.L.I., PRICrIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 5.02 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986) (Comment); MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT ANN. §
8.31 (3d ed. 1985) (Annotation).
"a Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 38 N.J.L. 505 (Ct. Err. App. 1875); Wardell v.
Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651, 658 (1880). 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
COPO TIONS § 917 (rev. perm ed. 1986).
14 Cumberland Coal and Iron. Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598 (Ct. App. 1875). The court there
stated: "[T]he remaining directors are placed in the embarrassing and invidious position of
having to pass upon, scrutinize and check the transactions and accounts of one of their own
body, with whom they are associated on terms of equality in the general management of all
the affairs of the corporation." Id. at 606.
" See Marsh, supranote 12 at 39-43. See also R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 5.1 (1986), where
the author suggests that the change in case outcomes respecting self-dealing were due to the
increase in the number of such cases relating to close corporations which has become greater
in number than those relating to public corporations. The analogous trust principle is
discussed in A. Scowr, ABmDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 170 (1960), as follows:
As to the duty of loyalty owed by a trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust, it is
important to distinguish the situation where the trustee in dealing with trust
property on his own account acts without the consent of the beneficiaries from the
situation where he so acts with their consent. Where the beneficiaries do not
consent, the transaction is voidable by them even though the trustee acted in good
faith and the transaction was in all other respects fair and reasonable. On the
other hand, where the beneficiaries consent to the transaction, it is not always
voidable by them; it is voidable if, but only if, the trustee failed to disclose to the
beneficiaries the material facts which he knew or should have known, or if he used
the influence of his position to induce the consent, or if the transaction was not in
all respects fair and reasonable.
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The newer and more flexible rule was justified on the basis of the
exigencies of modern business and the desirability of giving a reviewing
court the aid of the opinions of those most closely associated with the
corporation. 16
The concept of approval by a majority of disinterested directors
produced an additional set of issues. These included: (1) whether or not
the interested director could be counted for purposes of a quorum; 17 (2)
the nature of the interest which would disqualify a director from
participating in the decision to approve a transaction;' 8 (3) the nature of
the disclosure required with respect to the interest of the director;19 and
(4) the burden of proof in connection with the fairness or unfairness of the
20
transaction.
Later cases held that the sole test of validity is whether or not the
transaction is fair to the corporation and that the interested director
bears the burden of proving the inherent fairness of the transaction. 21 As
one commentator has pointed out: "The common law has moved from a
predictable standard which rendered transactions with interested directors voidable at the option of the corporation to a more flexible but
which the transactions are valid only if they
uncertain standard, under
22
are found to be fair."

16 R. CLARK, supra note 15, at § 4.1; Marsh, supra note 12, at 39-42.

See 3 W. FLETCHER,

17

CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATION

§ 938 (rev. perm. ed.

1986).
15

Id.

1

See Marsh, supra note 12 at 40-41.

20 Id. at 44 nn. 32-33.
21
22

Id at 43, n. 12.
Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 3, at 204. See also R. CLARK, supra note 15, at § 55.1.

Professor Clark suggests that a new stage began with the adoption of the 1975 California
Corporation Code. He stated:
In sum, the law seems to have evolved through three or four rules:
(1) a flat prohibition against basic self-dealing;
(2) a rule allowing basic self-dealing that is approved by a majority of disinterested directors and is fair;
(3) a rule allowing basic self-dealing that is fair, as found by a court; and
(4) in some states, perhaps, a rule allowing basic self-dealing that is fair or that

is approved by a majority of properly informed shareholders.
One naturally wonders about the meaning of these changes. What, if anything,

explains these historical shifts? Are the rules that have survived this evolutionary process justified? Are they optimal? These questions deserve the greatest
attention by those trying to understand the forces that shape corporate law.
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III.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Legislative attempts to deal with typical and frequently troublesome
conflicts of interest took a number of approaches. 23 For the most part, the
statutes were enabling, 24 saving such transactions, if the statutory tests
were met, from the common law doctrine of voidability, either with
respect to self-dealing transactions generally 25 or with respect to certain
transactions such as executive compensation. 26 Some statutes prohibited
categories of activities; 27 e.g. loans to directors. Others required approval
28
by shareholders in order to validate a specified transaction.
The first statute designed to apply to self-dealing transactions generally was adopted by California in 1931.29 It was to serve as the basic

model for subsequent statutes which would be widely adopted throughout
the country, in the search for a statutory solution for self-dealing. In
effect, the California statute codified the case law as it had developed in
the early part of the twentieth century. It declared that a transaction

23 See Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 3, at 204. See also 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE

LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 915 (rev. perm. ed. 1986).
24 See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 144 (1972).
25 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1985).
26 See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (Baldwin, 1970).
27 E.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 42 (1960). See also E. FOLK, supra note 24, at
73-74. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 143 (1985).
25 28 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.32 (1984) (Official Comment).
2 CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1986). The text of the statute provides:
Directors and officers shall exercise their powers in good faith, and with a view
to the interests of the corporation. No contract or other transaction between a
corporation and one or more of its directors, or between a corporation and any
corporation, firm, or association in which one or more of its directors, or between
a corporation and any corporation, firm, or association in which one or more of its
directors are directors or are financially interested, is either void or voidable
because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board of
directors or a committee thereof which authorizes or approves the contract or
transaction, or because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if the
circumstances specified in any of the following subdivisions exist:
(a) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or
known to the board of directors or committee and noted in the minutes, and the
board or committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction in
good faith by a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the vote or votes
of such director or directors.
(b) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or
known to the shareholders, and they approve or ratify the contract or transaction
in good faith by a majority vote or written consent of shareholders entitled to vote.
(c) The contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation at the
time it is authorized or approved.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of
a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which
authorizes, approves, or ratifies a contract or transaction.
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between a director and the corporation was neither void nor voidable
because the director was present or because his votes are counted for the
purpose of approving the transaction if there was disclosure of the
financial interest of the director and if it was (1) approved by the
disinterested directors; (2) approved by a majority of shareholders; or (3)
the transaction was "just and reasonable" to the corporation at the time
30
it was approved.
"Safe harbor" statutes of the California type have been adopted in
thirty-nine jurisdictions.3 1 The great impetus for their inclusion in
general corporation statutes came with the insertion of such a provision
into Delaware law3 2 in the general revision of 1967 and the addition of
3
a similar provision to the Model Business Corporation Act in 1969. 3

According to the Reporter for the Delaware revision, the section was not
to provide a basis for validating a transaction between a director and the
corporation but to enable such transactions by overturning the rule of
34
automatic voidability.
In addition to "safe harbor" provisions applicable to self dealing
between a corporate director and the corporation, generally, many states
also adopted, in the wake of the movement for corporate revision which
took place in the 1950's and 1960's, discrete provisions directed to typical,
and frequently troublesome, conflict of interest transactions. Many
states followed a Wisconsin law allowing directors, by an affirmative vote
of a majority of those in office, and irrespective of any personal interest of
any of them, to have the authority to establish reasonable compensation
including pension and death benefits, for services to the corporation by

30

Id.

31 ALA. CODE § 10-2A-63 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-041 (1986); CAL. CoRp. CODE

§

310 (West 1986); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-5-114.5 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323
(West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.124 (West 1986); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-155 (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 41 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-41 (1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. § 8.60 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-10-6 (Burns 1982); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 496A.34 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271A.205 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:84 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13A § 717(1) (1986); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-149 (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 450.1545, 450.1546 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 (West 1985); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 79-3-67 (1985); MoNor. CODE ANN. § 35-1-413 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2040.01
(1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.140 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:41 (1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14A:6-8(1)-(2) (West 1986); N.Y. Bus. CorP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-30(b) (1985); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (Anderson 1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 57.265 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1409.1 (Purdon 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-37.1
(1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160 (Law. Co-op 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-816 (1986); VT.
STAT. ANN. tt. II § 1888 (1986); VA. CODE § 13.1-691 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-25 (1986);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.355 (West 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-136.1 (1986).
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1984).

3 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 41 (rev. ed. 1969).
3 See E. FOLK, supra note 24, at 82.
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directors. 35 Such a provision was targeted to the close coporation36where
compensation arrangements could not be otherwised authorized.
Many states also regulated certain financial dealings between the
corporation and its directors. Some prohibited loans to directors. Some
prohibited the guarantee of director obligations.37 Others restricted
credit transactions between the director and the corporation unless
approved by the shareholders. 38
IV.

APPLICATION OF INTERESTED DIRECTOR STATuTEs To CLOSE CORPORATIONS

Inherent in the "safe harbor" statutes were the same interpretive
problems of the later common law approach outlined above. Unresolved
questions in many jurisdictions were: whether or not the statute in
question only acts to enable a transaction between the corporation and a
director rather than to validate it;39 whether or not the statute precludes
judicial inquiry into the fairness of a transaction if it is approved by
disinterested directors or by shareholders; 40 whether or not the disclosure

31 WIs. STAT. ANN. §

180.31 (West 1986).

Without such a statute, the practice of in seriatim voting was necessary where the
directors were also the officers of the corporation.
" See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. (2d ed. 1971) § 47 3.02.
3s DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 143 (1984); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 47 (rev. ed. 1969); N.Y.
BUSINESS CORP. LAW § 714 (McKinney 1986).
19 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. (3d ed. 1985) (Comment 1). See also, E. FOLK supra
note 24, at 82, where the author states:
Effect of the statute. Section 144(a) is negative in effect. A contract or transaction
covered by the statute is not void or voidable solely because those approving a
transaction have a conflict of interest, or solely because his vote is counted for that
purpose. The validating effect does not go beyond removing the spectre of
voidability which might otherwise arise from the presence of any one or more of
these three elements.
40 See E. FOLK, supra note 24, at 86-88; Nelson v. Gammar, 478 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Ky.
1979); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 311 A.2d 218 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1976); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp.,
386 F. Supp. 44 (D. N.J. 1974); Westec Corp. v. Ceirpenler, 434 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1970);
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dasclines Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952);
Veeger v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54 (1936). See also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES
36

OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02 (Tent. Draft No, 5 1986) (Comment) where it is stated:

Many states have 'safe harbor' statutes relating to transactions between
directors and the corporation. These statutes have generally approached conflictof-interest transactions in terms of the voidability of transactions and the effect of
approval by disinterested directors or shareholders, rather than imposing an
affirmative duty of loyalty. This may reflect the evolution of the law in this area
from a rule that originally permitted all transactions with directors to be set aside
without regard to fairness, and a tendency to leave the development of affirmative
duties of loyalty to the case law. All but four of these statutes may literally be read
to preclude judicial inquiry into the fairness of a transaction that has been
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requirements attach to the fact of the conflict or the material facts of the
transaction; 4 1 and whether or not there is a distinction between shareholder approval and director approval as to the requirement of disinterest. 42 In addition the definition of disinterested and the effect of the
statute on the burden of proof as to the issue of fairness was generally left
to the courts. 43 All of these issues posed particular problems for the close
directors who were likely to be nominees of
corporation, where there were
44
a particular shareholder.
5
There are surprisingly few reported cases interpreting the Delaware4
and MBCA46 statutes and their clones 47 in the context of the close
corporation. The recent cases generally concern the fallout from hostile
takeovers and fears of hostile takeovers. 48 Gries Sports Enterprises v.
Cleveland Browns Football Co., 49 a case recently decided by the Supreme
Court of Ohio, applying Delaware law, does present an archetypical fact
situation. The myriad of opinions growing out of the case serve to
demonstrate the difficulty, if not impossibility, of the useful application of
a safe harbor statute in the context of a close corporation. The case
involved a transaction between the Cleveland Browns Football Co.
(hereinafter the Corporation), the owner of the Cleveland Browns football
team, and Arthur Modell, a director and majority shareholder. The
Corporation acquired from Modell all of the outstanding shares of
another corporation, the Cleveland Stadium Coporation, for $6,000,000.
The transaction was approved by the board of directors of the Corporation. At the time of the transaction, March 16,1982, the Corporation had
two major shareholders, Modell 5o and Robert Gries.51 The board of
directors consisted of Modell; Modell's wife, Patricia Modell; James
Bailey, general counsel to the corporation and a full time employee;
James Berick, outside legal counsel to the corporation; Richard Cole;
Nate Wallak, also a full time employee of the corporation, and Robert

approved by disinterested directors or shareholders. In general, however, cases
interpreting these statutes have not squarely taken this position, and indeed seem
to reject the literal interpretation and permit judicial inquiry into fairness.
41 See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986)
(Reporter's Note and Comment).
42 See Bulbulia & Pinto supra note 3, at 81- 83.
43 Id. at 210 n. 69.
4 Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1985).
46 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 41 (rev. ed. 1969).
4' See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986)

(Reporter's Note 1).
48

See

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.

§ 4.

49 26 Ohio St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986).

" Arthur Modell owned fifty-three percent of the corporation's stock. 26 Ohio St. 3d at
15, 496 N.E.2d at 960.
Ii Robert Gries owned 43% of the corporation's stock. Id.
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Gries. All the directors of the corporation other than Gries, were
nominees of Modell although they had been elected with Gries' approval.
All directors attended the meeting at which the purchase was approved
52
by a 4-1 vote.
On the day following the date of the approval of the transaction, Gries
filed a shareholders' derivative action seeking rescission of the
acquisition. The basis of the complaint was that the shares of Cleveland
Stadium Corporation were overvalued and therefore the transaction was
unfair to the Corporation. Plaintiffs theory was that the directors who
had approved the transaction were "interested" and thus the defendant
Modell had the burden of proving "intrinsic fairness" in order to sustain
the validity of the transaction. Defendants contended that the
acquisition was approved by a majority of the disinterested directors in
accordance with the conflict of interest provision in the Deleware
Corporation Law53 and that the decision was thus protected by the
business judgment 54rule preventing any judicial inquiry as to the fairness
of the transaction.
After a four week trial in 1984, the trial judge concluded that the
approving directors were "interested"5 5 and that the defendants had
not established that the transaction was intrinsically fair to the
corporation. 56 The finding of "interest" was apparently based on a
transaction which preceded the transaction in question in which
directors Bailey, Berick and Cole had redeemed shares in the acquired corporation at a high value.5 7 In addition the court held

52

Gries voted "no". The Modells abstained from voting. Id.

5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1986).

5 26 Ohio. St. 3d at 20-22, 496 N.E.2d at 963-66.
5 Gries Sports Enter., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Case No. 40598, slip op.
(C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio Aug. 30, 1984). (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law),
reprinted in Appellant's Brief at app. 83, Gries, 15 Ohio St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986)

(No. 85-704).
" Id. (Conclusions of Law, 7), reprinted in Appellant's Brief at app. 94, Gries, 15 Ohio
St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986).
7 Id. In Conclusions of Law, paragraph 8, the Court concluded:
Even if the intrinsic fairness test were not applicable here, directors Cole,
Bailey and Berick still could not claim the protection of the 'business judgment'
rule, since that rule does not apply to actions taken by directors with respect to a
transaction which confers personal financial benefits upon the directors. Gottlieb
v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (1952). Directors Cole, Bailey and Berick
all derived personal financial benefits from the subject transaction. Accordingly,
the transaction was not approved by a majority consisting of disinterested
directors. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
Id. at app. 94-95.
Prior to the transaction in question, twenty percent of the Cleveland Stadium Corporation had been owned by persons other than Modell including Berick, Bailey, Wallack, Cole
and Gries. On March 2, 1982 these shareholders had redeemed all of their shares for
$120.00 per share. Each had previously had an option to sell the shares back to the
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that they were further interested in that they were beholden to
Modell.58
The defendants appealed to an intermediate appellate court. Almost a
year elapsed. On April 25, 1985, the appellate court in a 2-1 decision
reversed the judgment of the trial court.59 The majority of the appellate
panel held that neither the interest of the directors in the prior acquisiton
nor the status as Modell's nominees rendered them "interested" within
the meaning of the Delaware statute. 60 Nor did the fact that one was
either a full time employee or outside counsel by itself constitute enough
to disqualify. 6 1 The court cited with approval the following language from
62
Aronson v. Lewis:
Thus it is not enough to charge that a director was nominated by
or elected at the behest of those controlling the outcome of a
coporate election. That is the usual way a person becomes a
corporate director. It is the care, attention and sense of individual
responsibility to the performance of one's duties, not the method

Corporation at a price of $32.00 per share. Although the redemption was a prelude to the
acquisition of the shares of CSC, the redemption was completed on March 2, 1982 and was
not contingent on the subsequent share purchase. 26 Ohio St. 3d at 16, 496 N.E.2d at 961.
5 In Findings of Fact, paragraph 23, the court also found:
As of March 16, 1982, directors Berick, Bailey and Wallach [sic] were clearly
beholden to defendant Modell, in that the continuation of their employment (as
outside counsel in the case of Mr. Berick, and as full-time employees of the Browns
in the case of Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wallack) was entirely dependent upon their
retaining the goodwill of Mr. Modell, who, as Chief Executive Officer of the
Browns, had the power to discharge them. Director Cole, the former brother-in-law of plaintiff Robert D. Gries, was similarly beholden to defendant Modell,
for on January 13, 1982, Modell and Cole had entered into a written agreement
wherein Modell agreed:
(a) To cause the Browns to buy Cole's stock in the Browns for
$665,000;
(b) to personally purchase Cole's shares in CSC for $192,000, if such
shares were not redeemed by CSC, at that price, by March 1, 1982;
(c) to support Cole's "re-election as a Director so long as we mutually
agree that it is in our joint best interests and in the best interest of all
the shareholders of CBFC.";
(d) to continue Cole's salary and Blue Cross coverage as a Vice
President of the Browns for a period of five years. In addition, prior to
the March 16, 1982 Board meeting, director Cole had obtained employment with a travel agency, 50% of which was owned by the Browns. The
Board of Directors of the Browns was therefore dominated by ABM.
Gries, Case No. 40598, slip op. (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio Aug. 30, 1984), reprinted
in Appellant's Brief at app. 90, Gries, 15 Ohio St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986).
" Gries Sports Enter., Inc. v, Cleveland Browns Football Co., Case Nos. 49184, 49197,
slip op. (Ct. App. 8th Dist. Ohio Apr. 25, 1985).
60 Id. at 14-15.
61 id.
62 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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of election, that generally touches on independence (citation
omitted). Additionally the mere fact that a director is an employee of the corporation does not mean that he or she is
63
dominated by a majority shareholder.
On the facts, the appellate court then found that, of the four directors who
had approved the transaction, one was "interested;"64 one probably
"interested;" 65 and two "disinterested."'6 6 Since, in the appellate court's
opinion the transaction had thus been approved (2-1) by disinterested
directors, the trial court should not have considered the question of
fairness. 67 In a dissenting opinion, the third appellate judge concluded
that the financial interest in the prior redemption was in itself sufficient
to supply an "interest" as was the fact that one director was the
68
Corporation's outside counsel.
The plaintiff then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. Another year
elapsed. On August 20,1986, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court by a
vote of 4-3.69 Five opinions were written. 70 The opinion of the Court

concluded that all of the directors who voted in favor of the acquisition

6 Id. at 815.
64 Gries, slip op. at 17 (Ct. App. 8th Dist. Ohio Apr. 25, 1985) (Cole).
68 Id. at 19 (Bailey).
66 Id. at 15-18.
67 Id. at 23.
68 The dissenting judge stated:
The record reveals that the March 2, 1982 stock redemption was an integral
part of the March 16, 1982 CSC acquisition. There would not have been a
redemption, but for the impending acquisition of CSC. On March 2, 1982, Modell
caused CSC to redeem the remaining 20 percent of its outstanding stock that was
owned by persons or entities other than Modell for $120 per share. When the
redemption was completed, Modell owned 100 percent of the stock in CSC. The
total cost to CSC for this stock redemption was $1,200,000, all of which was
borrowed from Central National Bank (CNB) as evidenced by a promissory note
from CSC to CNB, dated March 2, 1982. Under the plan for the Browns to
purchase Modell's 100 percent interest in CSC, the Browns would borrow
$6,000,000 from CNB. CNB would then disburse $4,800,000 to Modell for his
stock of CSC and disburse $1,200,000 to itself, to be treated as the Browns'
contribution of such amount to the capital of CSC and CSC's repayment of the
March 2, 1983 loan. This disbursement was completed by 7:45 a.m. on March 17,
1982.
Moreover, the record demonstrates that the transaction was originally structured as a single transaction. However, it was changed to two transactions for tax
purposes. Id. at 8-9 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
69 26 Ohio St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986).
70 Judge Wise of the Fifth Appellate District sitting for Justice Locher wrote the opinion
of the Court. Justice Brown wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Holmes, Douglas and
Wright each wrote dissenting opinions. Id.
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were "interested." 71 Their interest resided in dual positions with the
acquiring and the acquired corporations, either as shareholders 72 or
employees,73 their involvement in the legal structuring of the acquistion
transaction as counsel,7 4 their having sold their shares in the acquired
corporations in the redemption transaction which took place prior to the
acquisition, 75 and Berick's position as outside counsel to the corporation. 76 A concurring justice based his finding of interest on the prior
redemption transaction which he characterized as a special financial
benefit from the acquisition 77 but rejected the idea that a director is
automatically dominated by the corporation's chief executive officer
because he serves as outside counsel for the corporation. 78 Three
dissenting justices found three of the four directors who voted in favor of
the acquisition to be "disinterested" and only one 79 to be sufficiently
dominated by Modell through "intense financial dependence" to be
"interested". 80 The following chart tabulates the conclusions of the
eleven judges who considered this case as to the question of interest (or
disinterest). The chart indicates whether or not the respective directors
who voted in favor of the acquisition were found by the judge to be
disqualified by reason of interest.

71

The Ohio Supreme Court applied the following test to the issue of interest:
Under Delaware law, (A) a director is interested if (1) he appears on both sides
of a transaction or (2) he has or expects to derive personal financial benefit not

equally received by the stockholders; (B) a director is independent if his decision
is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than

extraneous considerations or influences; a director is not independent when he is
dominated by or beholden to another person through personal or other relationships, and (C) a director is informed if he makes a reasonable effort to become
familiar with the relevant and reasonably available facts prior to making a

business judgment.
Id. at 22, 496 N.E.2d at 965.
72

Id. at 22-23.

73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76

Id.

77 Id. at 28-29, 496 N.E.2d at 970.

7 Id. at 21, 496 N.E.2d at 970. Justice Brown states in his concurring opinion:
I wish to emphasize that I reject the idea that a director is automatically
"dominated" by the corporation's chief executive officer merely because that
director is outside counsel for the corporation. I say this because a strained

construction of Part I B of the majority opinion might raise this unwarranted
implication in the minds of some readers.
79 26 Ohio St. 3d at 41-46, 496 N.E.2d at 979-83. (Cole was the director found to be

sufficiently dominated by Modell).
so Id.
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Angelotta
(Court of Common Pleas
Trial Judge)
Corrigan
(Court of Appeals-Majority)
Parrino
(Court of Appeals-Majority)
Jackson
(Court of Appeals-Dissent)
Wise
(Supreme Court-Majority)
Celebrezze
(Supreme Court-Majority)
Sweeney
(Supreme Court-Majority)
Brown
(Supreme Court-Concurring)
Douglas
(Supreme Court-Dissent)
Wright
(Supreme Court-Dissent)
Holmes
(Supreme Court-Dissent)

Bailey
yes

Berick
yes

Cole
yes

Wallack
yes

?

no

yes

no

no

yes

no

no

yes

no

no

yes

no

no

yes

Five of the judges involved concluded that the directors were not
"disintested" by virtue of the director's participation in a stock redemption which was completed at the time of the transaction in question but
found to be a prelude thereto.81 Five of the judges concluded that directors
were not "disinterested" because they were dominated by the majority
shareholder who nominated them for their offices.82 Four of the judges

concluded that involvement as an employee of both corporations was
sufficient to render a director "disinterested."83 Five of the judges
concluded that service as outside counsel to the corporation rendered a
director not "disinterested." 8 4 All of the judges found intense financial
involvement in other transactions between the director and the majority
shareholder disqualifying for purposes of the statute.8 5

8 Corrigan, Parrino, Douglas, Wayne and Holmes.
82 Angelotta, Wise, Celebrezze, Sweeney and Brown.
83 Angelotta, Wise, Celebrezze and Sweeney.
84 Wise, Celebreeze and Sweeney.
85 This related only to Richard Cole.
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The Griescase also serves an an example of the difficulties encountered
in applying the third leg of the safe harbor statute to close corporation
cases. The Delaware statute, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or
more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any
other corporation, partership, association, or other organization
in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or
officers, or have a finanical interest, shall be void or voidable
solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because
his or their votes are counted for such purpose if:

(3) The contract or transaction is fair as of the time it is
authorized approved or ratified, by the board of directors,
a committee or the shareholders. 86
The presumed effect of this part of the statute is to subject corporate
decision making to judicial review. What it does in reality is to defer the
corporate decision to the judge who acts more or less as the beneficent
dictator, substituting his business judgment based on his business
experience (if any) and personal values for that of the corporate participants. Although voluminous testimony was produced at trial with respect
to the valuation of the acquired corporation, in order to make a determination as to "fairness" the trial judge disregarded the expert testimony in
its entirety.8 7 He, in effect, constituted himself the "ideal" director. He
describes the process by which he came to the conclusion that the
transaction was unfair in a letter announcing his decision. 88 He stated:
8 DEL. CORP. CODE tit. 8 § 144 (1986).
87 Conclusion of Law paragraph 31 states:

After carefully considering and evaluating the testimony and credibility of the
various expert witnesses who testified at trial as to the value of CSC's lease of the
Stadium and CSC's right to manage and operate the Stadium until 1998, the
Court finds that the opinion testimony of such witnesses is not entitled to any
weight.
Gries,Case No. 40598, slip op. (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio Aug. 30, 1984), reprintedin
Appellant's Brief at app. 92, Gries, 15 Ohio St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986).
" In a letter to Marvin L. Karp and Patrick F. McCarten from Judge Angelotta dated
Aug. 2, 1982, the Judge stated:
Now a brief reference to experts. I am told that Oscar Wilde once described a
cynic as a person 'who knows the cost of everything and the value of nothing.' Mr.
Wilde describes an expert. If I had any reservation about the value of the experts,
that is, any good reservation, it was totally destroyed by Mr. Desmond when he
stated, 'you can prove anything you want with numbers, that's easy.' Now, really,
when a judge listens to testimony from experts who testify that CSC has a value
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I place myself in the position of the board. The only question
before me is the value of Cleveland Stadium Corporation. I
review the report and conclude Stadium operations to be a
worthwhile purchase. I further review the report and with
particular reference to page 23 thereof, I note the indebtedness as
it relates to the land and with lesser reference to the hotel
investment. I recognize neither the land nor hotel have anything
to do with football. I know the Browns neither seek investment or
diversification. I would have noted that to be profitable the whole
transaction must be worth in excess of $14,000,000 to the Browns.
Six million dollars is being spent to buy the stock of the CSC, in
excess of $8,000,000 of CSC debt is being assumed. I would have
voted 'nay'. s 9

ranging from negative $69,000 to plus $12.4 million, the whole subject becomes
somewhat ludicrous. No responsible person could make an intelligent judgment
from such testimony. I charge myself with the applicable law to weigh expert
testimony, to apply the usual rules for testing credibility, and to determine the
weight to be given to the testimony of experts. In this case I place no value on the
testimony of experts.
Id. at page 2. Appellee's Brief at app. 1-2, Gries, 26 Ohio St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986).
The Ohio Supreme Court majority appears to have accepted a transactional test with
respect to "fairness" based on the timing, structuring, negotiation, disclosure and approval
of one transaction. 26 Ohio St.3d at 21, 496 N.E.2d at 964. See also Comment, "Interested
Director's"Contracts - Section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law and the
"Fairness"Test, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1973).
89 During a taped interview between the trial judge and a radio station reporter Jeffrey
N. Schudel on August 23, 1984, the trial judge observed:
And I took myself back to March 16th, 1982 at which time the Board of
Judge:
Directors of the Cleveland Browns had to make a decision and the
information they had before them was this valuation of Cleveland
Stadium Corporation made by McDonald & Company and it is from
that evaluation that the Board made a decision and it is from that
evaluation that I made a decision. I dismissed the testimony of all of
the experts because they came later.
Schudel: Yeah. Okay so then...
They were just coming in to either validate what Modell ... or validate
Judge:
what Gries said, depending on which side they were on.
Schudel: Okay, so if the numbers could be made to say anything, how can a
judgment be made on what it's worth?
On the Cleveland Stadium Corporation evaluation of March 16, 1982.
Judge:
That's what the Board of Directors had in front of them when they,
when they decided to buy.
Schudel: Okay, I thought that's what it said, I thought that evaluation said it
was worth 6 million or whatever they paid, is that what that evaluation said?
Urn, if you accept the valuation as being conclusive, yes, but as you
Judge:
read it, there were, for example, on the land it was apparent to me that
there was a debt of almost $2 million on the land. That isn't what the
report said.
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It is not necessary for the purposes of this article to consider which, if any
of the seven opinions in the Gries case correctly applies Delaware law
with respect to the safe harbor statute. In the aggregate, the several
opinions demonstrate that this approach to self-dealing transactions is
not helpful in providing an efficient solution to the problem presented in
this context. "Disinterest" is simply not practicable in a context where
the relationships among the directors and shareholders will inevitably be
complex. 90 The close corporation that would have any number of directors
who were not related to the majority shareholder in some way through
finances, family or employment would be rare indeed. The ultimate result
is to defer the business decision to a prolonged and expensive judicial
proceeding. Then one ultimate decision is made by a judge neither with
a background in the particular business nor with constraints imposed by
the market. 91 In the Gries case, the transaction was voided after four
years of litigation and the expenditure of millions of dollars in counsel
and expert fees by both the shareholders and the corporation. 92 It can

Oh.
You see in the report McDonald & Company says that we value the
land in 1975 at, I don't remember what the figures were, and I'm
obviously not looking at anything right now, but 3.2 million and then
they said that same land, five years later by adding a percentage,
whatever percentage you're applying, would run the value up, of the
land up to over $5 million in 1980. Well that isn't the way you make an
evaluation of land. You don't say that it was worth so much today and
then 5 years later it's worth so much, what you do is 5 years later you
go out to the land and look at it.
Schudel: In other words, they speculated more than evaluated it, is that right?
Judge:
Well, they just put a percentage, and ran it up by those numbers. But,
really what they should have done in 1982, was go out to the land and
make an evaluation and they didn't do that. So I rejected their value of
this, of 3.8 million, I think the value of the land was more in the area
of $750,000 and it does have a 2.6 million debt. Consequently, the
Browns bought a debt of almost $2 million.
Appellee's Brief at app. 14-16, Gries, 26 Ohio St. 3d 15, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986).
The Supreme Court, sustained the trial court's conclusions on fairness on the basis of the
finding that the purchase increased the Browns' indebtedness by $8,000,000. 26 Ohio St. 3d
at 22, 496 N.E.2d at 965.
90 For example, Richard Cole not only had numerous business relationships with Arthur
Modell; he was also Robert Gries' former brother-in-law.
91 Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1982).
92 Plaintiffs filed an application asking for over one million dollars in attorney fees to be
Schudel:
Judge:

awarded from the corporation. At the same time it was estimated that the Cleveland
Browns and Modell had spent 1.6 million dollars in attorney fees. Legal Arms Earn More
Than Kosar, The Plain Dealer, Oct. 15, 1986, at 1B, col. 1; Modell-Gries Settle Their Suit
Over The Browns, The Plain Dealer, Dec. 7, 1986, at 5B, col. 1. On March 17, 1986, the
Corporation was enjoined by the Supreme Court from selling the stock of the Stadium
Corporation for $7 million; which is 1 million more than had been paid for it and $4 million
more than the plaintiff had contended it was worth. 26 (Vio. St. 3d at 35, 496 N.E.2d at 77.
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easily be surmised that shareholders would not have adopted such a rule
if they had considered the problem at the time of incorporation.

V.

PROPOSALS FOR STATUTORY REFORM

A number of law reform projects surfaced in the latter part of the 1970's
and early part of the 1980's. These efforts have been directed to major
revisions of the general corporation laws and much of their focus has been
on conflicts of interest. 93 They provide little in the way of gap-filling for
the close corporation. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the American
Bar Association Section of Corporation Banking and Business Law
promulgated a Revised Model Business Corporation Act in 1985. 94 Although an earlier version cast the entire problem of conflicts of interest
in terms of fairness and the burden of proof with respect to fairness,95 the

9' See Fischel, supra note 92.
14 See Hamilton, supra note 4.
95 1983 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 (Exposure Draft 1983). The text of the
earlier version was as follows:
Section 8.31. DIRECTOR OR OFFICER CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
(a) If a transaction is fair to a corporation at the time it is authorized, approved,
or ratified, the fact that a director or officer of the corporation has a direct or
indirect interest in the transaction is not a ground for invalidating the transaction
or for imposing liability on that director or officer.
(b) In a proceeding contesting the validity of a transaction in which a director
or officer has an interest, the person asserting validity has the burden of proving
fairness unless:
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's or officer's
interest were disclosed or known to the board of directors or a committee
of the board and the board or committee of the board and the board or
committee authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction by the vote
of a requisite quorum of directors who has no interest in the transaction;
or
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's or officer's
interest were disclosed to the shareholders entitled to vote and they
authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction by the vote of a
requisite quorum of shareholders who had no interest in the transaction.
(c) the presence of, or votes entitled to be cast by, the director or officer who has
a direct or indirect interest in the transaction may be counted in determining
whether a quorum is present but may not be counted when the board of directors,
a committee of the board, or the shareholders vote on the transaction.
(d) For purposes of this section, a director or officer has an indirect interest in
a transaction if an entity in which he has a material financial interest or in which
he is an officer, director, or general partner is a party to the transaction. A vote
or consent of that entity is deemed to be a vote or consent of the director or officer
for purposes of subsection (c).
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final version reverted to language similar to that which had been included
in the Model Business Corporation Act in 1969.96
The American Law Institute, in 1981, began a study of the principles of
corporate governance. 97 A substantial portion of the work of the project is
directed toward the duty of loyalty and in turn to the question of conflicts
of interest. 98 In the initial proposal directed to conflicts of interest,
transactions were approached as a breach of the duty of loyalty unless
authorized by "disinterested"99 directors after full disclosure of the
material facts. 0 0° A later draft announces the principle that directors
have a duty, when personally interested in a matter affecting the
corporation, to deal fairly with the corporation. A director fulfills that
duty in a transaction with the corporation if there is full disclosure
concerning both the conflict and the transaction, and the transaction is
(1) fair to the corporation; (2) authorized by disinterested directors and
could be reasonably believed to be fair to the corporation; or (3) authorized by disinterested shareholders and does not constitute waste. 10 1
A new rule, in the later draft, provides input, that a "dominating"
shareholder who enters into a transaction with the corporation fulfills his
duty of loyalty to the corporation if the transaction is approved by disinterested shareholders. 102 At first glance, the dominating shareholder rule
is more helpful to the close corporation than prior rules which focus on
transactions at the director level. By concentrating on the shareholder
level, it is easier to determine questions of disinterest which can be directly
related to the shareholders' financial interest in the transaction. There is
unlikely to be the same difficulty with the relationship of nominees to the
transaction at the shareholders level.'11 A study of the Comment to the
rule, however, shows that the problems of concern to the drafters were
those of minority shareholder freeze-out by dominating parent corporations rather than the garden variety of close corporation self-dealing

96

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31 (3d ed. 1985). A separate provision validated

corporate loans or guarantees to directors if (a) approved by a majority of disinterested
shareholders, or (b) approved by the directors on a determination that the loan or guarantee
benefits the corporation. Id. at § 8.32.
7 See supra note 5.
98 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 5.02, (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986).
9 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 5.02, (Tent. Draft No. 7 1986). The
reporter points out the importance of the nature of disinterested representations as a

technique for dealing with conflict of interest. This is expressly stated in the context of the
public corporation. Id. (Comment to § 5.02(a)(2)(C)).

A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.08 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1984).
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986). This
section is cited in the concurring opinion in the Gries case as supporting the fairness
decision in one case. 26 Ohio St. 3d at 31, 496 N.E.2d at 971-72.
102 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.10 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986).
03 Id. at § 1.12 (defining a dominating shareholder "as one who owns 50% of the
outstanding voting remainder or executive control over management.").
100
'
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transactions. 0 4 The proposed rule would not offer any solution to the
problem of judicial review where there is a failure to obtain disinterested
shareholder approval.

VI.

CLOSE CORPORATION STATUTES

Since the adoption of the first special laws for close corporations by
New York in 1948,10 followed by North Carolina in 1955,106 a majority of
states have passed provisions designed to accommodate the close corporation's need for intra-corporate flexibility. 10 7 These acts either consist of
an integrated statute collecting provisions applicable to close corporations in a separate chapter or subdivision of the business corporation
lawl0s or a series of provisions designed for close corporations spread
throughout the general business corporation act.'0 9 In both cases, the
objectives of the provisons are: (1) to allow informality in the corporation's internal affairs; (2) to validate shareholders agreements respecting
matters such as employment or profit distribution as against case law
holdings that such agreements were void in that they sterilized the board
of directors; (3) to allow or require restrictions on the transfer of shares;
and (4) to provide remedies for dissension, deadlocks, and shareholder
opppression. 110 None of these provisions are self-executing. They depend
upon shareholder implementation, by agreement, insertion in corporate
documents or the institution of judicial or arbitration proceedings. The
Delaware close corporation sections,11 ' typically, allow for agreements

restricting discretion of directors, 1 2 management by shareholders," 3 the
appointment of a custodian1 14 or provisional director" 15 in the event of
deadlock, the elimination of the objection to the validity of corporate
agreements on the basis that the corporation is being operated as a
partnership, 116 and provisions allowing one or more shareholders the
117
right to dissolve the corporation at will or upon a given contingency.

104

In addition the drafters defer the implementation to judicial decision rather than

statute. Id. (Comment to §§ 5.10(b) to (c)).
o NEW YORK STOCK CORPORATION LAW, § 9 (1948).
06 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1 to 55-175 (1955).
107 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at § 1.14.
o Id. at § 1.14b.
109 Id. at § 1.14.
110 Id.
111 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8

Id. at § 350.
- Id. at § 351.
114 Id. at § 352.
11 Id. at § 353.
116 Id. at § 354.
117 Id. at § 355.
112

§§

341-356.
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These statutes are enabling. They are affirmative only to the extent that
they promote remedial action by judicial proceedings. While the emphasis since their inception has been on allowing the shareholders of a close
corporation to design their own corporate structure through contractual
arrangements, little thought appears to have been given to providing a
general form of contract presumed to be what they would adopt had they
thought about it. Although it is very likely that a transaction involving
a conflict of interest may trigger one of the close corporation provisions
concerning dissension, deadlock or oppression, a presumptive resolution
is not provided. 118
In 1981, The Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Banking,
Business and Corporation Law of the American Bar Association promulgated the Model Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business
Corporation Act. 119 Prior to that time the Model Business Corporation
Act had been amended from time to time to include many provisions
applicable to close corporations on a non-integrated basis. 12° The new
Supplement not only provided an optional integrated statute such as
Delaware's but also included typical provisions which would apply to the
corporation unless otherwise provided by the shareholders. These include
share transfer prohibitions, 1 21 and the compulsory purchase of shares
after the death of shareholders.1 22 In the Offical Comment, the drafters of
the Close Corporation Supplement explain their inclusion of such provisions.
This section sets out a standardized transfer prohibition that
automatically applies unless the articles of incorporation provided otherwise. The prohibition is designed to accomplish two
purposes, first, to provide a prohibition that fits the needs of a
'typical' close corporation; and second, to facilitate alteration in
order to fit the special needs of the shareholders in a particular
23
corporation.1
No attempt, however, was made by the drafters of either the Revised
Model Act or any other statute to find provisions which would apply to
problems of conflict of interest in the close corporation, where the
shareholders had not made a separate agreement. In every case, provi-

"' See Hetherington & Dooly, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977).
119 Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, CorporateLaws, Statutory Close Corporation
Laws, Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business CorporationAct, 38
Bus. LAW. 1031 (1982). See also Kessler, The ABA Close CorporationStatute, 36 MERCER L.
REv. 661 (1985).
120 E.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, §§ 34, 44, 97 (1984).
121 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, §§ 1-13.
122 Id. at §§ 14-15.
123

Id. at § 12 (Comment to § 12).
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sions of the general corporation law directed to such transactions, when
they exist, apply to both public and close corporations.
VII.

PARTNERSHIP TREATMENT OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

Since the close corporation is frequently considered an incorporated
partnership, 124 it is useful to examine statutory law applicable to selfdealing transactions by partners and its possible applicablity to the close
corporation.
The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) has now been adopted in fifty-one
jurisdictions.125 In major part, it presents an example of a statutory gap
filler. To the extent that the UPA affects dealings by the partners, inter
sese, it is in effect a statutory standard form of contract, which partners
may vary by drafting to accommodate individual needs and desires. In
the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, the statutory
provisions establish a rule to be applied to the given transaction. Conflict
of interest transactions, in the main, are covered by section 21(1) to wit:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit,
and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the
consent of the other partners from any transaction connected
with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or
from any use by him of its property.126
It is readily observed that the rule is derived from general principles of
trust and agency law and that the effect is basically to prohibit selfdealing transactions absent the consent of the other partners. 27 Although such a rule in the corporate setting undermines majority control,128 case law developments with respect to close corporations, by
applying the fiduciary principles among shareholders, have gone a long
way toward requiring such a result.129 Partnerships have consistently

124 See Kessler, supra note 119, at 663.
125 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (1969 & Supp. 1986) (Uniform Partnership Act; Table of
Jurisdictions where Act has been adopted).
126 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21(1) (1916), reprintedin UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (1969).
127 Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-98 (1958); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia'sNew PartnershipLaw, 36 MERCER.
L. REV. 443, 474 (1985).
121 One author writing in the general context of self-dealing in corporations has

suggested that breaches of legality reduce the amount of the investment minority shareholders will make, providing incentive to management to avoid these problems. Scott,
CorporationLaw and the American Law Institute CorporateGovernance Project, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 926, 938 (1983). See also Anderson Conflicts of Interest, Efficiency, Fairness and
Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 739, 773 (1978).

12' Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975); Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). See LaGarga, Conflict of
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operated on this principle. A statutory provision would lend certainty to
the procedures for conducting business. It is also very likely that a rule
requiring unanimous consent of the shareholders (or of a majority of the
shareholders not directly involved in the transaction 13 0 ) would be the rule
adopted by close corporation shareholders if they had bargained in
1
advance with respect to conflicts of interest.13

VIII.

PARTNERSHIP RULES

As

APPLIED

To

CLOSE CORPORATION TRANSACTIONS

It is instructive to consider the result in the Gries case had Delaware
corporation law provided that majority shareholders, absent a shareholder agreement to the contrary, might only deal with the corporation
with the consent of a majority of the other shareholders. Had that been
the case, the resolution of the controversy concerning the acquisition of
the Cleveland Stadium Corporaton would have been precisely the same
as that ultimately reached by the Ohio Supreme Court but without five
years of litigation and millions of dollars in costs and fees. Although the
result would have been unpalatable to the majority shareholder and
might have precipitated other shareholder strife132 between him and the
plaintiff in the action, it would have at least brought a degree of certainty
to the parameters of dealing in the organization. Alternative plans could

Interest Transactions: FiduciaryDuties of Corporate Directors Who Are Also Controlling
Shareholders, 57 DEN. L.J. 609 (1980). See also Beane, The FiduciaryRelationship of a
Partner,5 J. CoRP. L. 483 (1980). The author comments as follows:
It has therefore been universally agreed that a joint adventurer or partner is
prohibited from self-dealing during the pendency of the venture, and that any
profits realized from self-dealing belong to the venture or partnership. In a case
involving the managing partner of a wholesale partnership which sold merchandise to a retail partnership of which he was also a member, even though the
wholesale partnership could not show it was injured, the court held the partner
assumed the burden of proving that the wholesale firm was not injured by his
dealing between the two firms of which he was a member. However, if the
agreement between the partners relied upon permitted self-dealing, such a
provision is not in and of itself violative of law, and there would be no breach of
the fiduciary duty.
Id. at 503 (emphasis original) (footnotes omitted). See also Empirical Research Project,
Statutory Needs of Close Corporations-AnEmpirical Study: Special Close Corporation
Legislation or Flexible CorporationLaw?, 10 J. CoRP. L. 849, 933 (1985).
3' A rule could be developed which would be based on total lack of participation as the
test for noninvolvement (or disinterest).
"' Observation of six interviews by students at Cleveland State University of purported
clients seeking to form a close corporation elicited from the clients the desire to have a veto
over such transaction in five of six cases.
132 It has frequently been argued that the alternate solution for such disagreements is
dissolution, again the partnership solution. See Hetherington, Trends in Legislation for
Close Corporations:A Comparisonof the Wisconsin Business CorporationLaw of 1951 and
One New York Bureau CorporateLaw of 1951, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 92, 131 (1963).
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have been made for the disposition of the Cleveland Stadium Corporation1 33 or some settlement could have been arrived at between the
disagreeing shareholders. Importantly, it would have reserved the decision making to the participants in the enterprise rather than to the
uncertain concept of "fairness" as applied by the judiciary.
The existence of a statute providing a fixed rule, not dependent on proof
of fairness, e.g.:
Unless otherwise provided by the Articles of Incorporation, no
contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or
more of its directors shall be valid without the approval of a
majority of the shareholders of the corporation, who are not
parties to the transaction, after disclosure concerning both the
3
conflict of interest and the transaction,1 4
would also serve the ends of initial planning. In the case of the Cleveland
Browns Football Company, the parties were undoubtedly represented in
the formation of the corporation and subsequent shareholder arrangements. The existence of a fixed provision could have served as a signal to
counsel to provide a rule for future transactions.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Gries case demonstrates that statutory provisions relating to
conflict of interest transactions which focus on approval of disinterested
participants at the director level do not serve the close corporation well.
They, in fact, serve only to defer the decision with respect to any disputed
transaction to a judicial determination of fairness for which there is little
in the way of objective guidelines in the close corporation setting.
Although a rule prohibiting such transactions unless approved by the
non-participating shareholders may produce minority rule, it is preferable to have a rule of easy application rather than rules which are
impossible of application and uncertain of result. The inclusion in modern
corporation laws of a rule similar to that of partnership law prohibiting
such transactions unless the parties provide to the contrary in the
articles, bylaws or separate contract would have the virtue of certainty
and reflect, as well, the wishes of most close corporation participants, who
would be free to contract to the contrary if they choose.

133 As to later proposed alternative transactions see supra note 93.

...Cf. A.L.I.,

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §10 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986).
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